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Emergency Management Plan

Section 7

## **7-2 Terrorism Plan**

**June 2006**



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# TERRORISM INCIDENT

## Preface

In the wake of September 11, 2001 World Trade Center Attacks in New York and the Oklahoma City Bombing, terrorism has become an increasing concern for emergency management, emergency responders, and the public at large.

Terrorism is the threat or use of force or violence against persons and property to achieve political / social ends and is usually associated with community disruption and / or multiple injuries or death.

This plan augments the existing Horry County Emergency Management Plan.

## **I. PURPOSE AND POLICY.**

### **A. PURPOSE.**

1. This WMD Plan and its accompanying attachments provide a framework for planning and responding to a terrorist threat or incident occurring within Horry County. The ultimate goal is to identify potential terrorist targets and reduce their vulnerability. If those efforts fail, it is the County's and its municipalities responsibility to respond in a timely and efficient manner to control the incident, protect lives and property, maintain the continuity of government, recover and ultimately return to normal. These goals will be accomplished through a coordinated plan involving all County and municipal Departments, and pertinent jurisdictions and agencies.
2. The purpose of this Plan is to:
  - Support the Horry County Emergency Management Department (EMD) public policy of preparing for, and responding to, any and all threats to the safety of its citizens. This Plan augments the Horry County Emergency Management Plan (EMP) and addresses terrorist events.
  - Provide general guidance for the coordination of emergency operations and resources within Horry County to save lives, protect property and restore order in the event of a terrorist event.
  - Provide specific direction to involve County and municipal departments.
  - Serve as reference information for response to terrorist events.
  - Clarify the roles and relationships of municipal, county, state, federal agencies with the threat or actual occurrence of terrorist events.

### **B. POLICY.**

It is the policy of the Horry County Emergency Management Department:

1. That the Horry County Law Enforcement and/or appropriate municipal Police Department(s) will exercise broad lawful authority, within existing capabilities, to protect life and property threatened by acts of terrorism to include ordering evacuations, curfews and other necessary actions to contain or control the incident.
2. That the Horry County Law Enforcement and/or appropriate municipal Police Department(s) will normally retain the role of the "incident commander" until the threat to public safety is abated, or the

incident command is transferred to the appropriate state or federal agency.

3. To establish overall direction, control, and coordination through an activation of the Horry County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to support the response to and consequences of a terrorist act.
4. To utilize the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and its Incident Command System (ICS) as the organizational basis for response to terrorist incidents.
5. To ensure notification of appropriate state and federal agencies.

## **II. SITUATION.**

### **A. SITUATION.**

1. The terrorist threat presents additional challenges to the emergency response structure. Terrorist acts can range from small destructive acts with limited damage and no casualties to a worse case scenario utilizing weapons of mass destruction that cause massive casualties and major response and recovery efforts. The terrorist incident can present itself with a period of preparation and buildup, or as a dramatic event with no advanced warning.
2. Horry County EMD has completed the various state/federal required "Threat and Risk Assessments" to help identify potential terrorist targets. The findings and conclusions of that assessment are on file in the Emergency Management office.

### **B. CONSTRAINTS (LIMITATIONS).**

1. Horry County and its municipalities, mutual aid resources and South Carolina state agencies have a limited capability for responding to terrorist events.
2. Local hospitals have limited civilian victim decontamination capability.

## **III. ASSUMPTIONS.**

### **A. GENERAL.**

- Horry County is subject to acts of terrorism.
- Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and other terrorist acts may involve mass casualties and damage to buildings or other types of property. The county and municipal emergency responders' ability to identify aspects of the incident (e.g., signs and symptoms exhibited by victims), report them accurately, and protect themselves, will be essential to maximize the use of critical county resources and trigger the state and federal response.

### **B. REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD):**

- Terrorist attacks are usually directed at population centers and buildings or facilities that conduct operations for government, transportation, or industry.
- Terrorist attacks may or may not be preceded by a warning or a threat, and may at first appear to be an

ordinary hazardous materials incident.

- Terrorist attacks may require a vast response effort from all levels of government (Federal, state, local).
- Terrorist attacks may result in large numbers of casualties, including fatalities, physical injuries, and psychological trauma.
- The attack may be at multiple locations and include multiple events.
- The attack may be accompanied by fire, explosion, or other acts of sabotage.
- Responders are at risk of being casualties or targets. There may be a booby trap device set off to attract emergency responders, and then a second device is set off for the purpose of injuring the emergency responders.
- The presence of a chemical or biological agent may not be recognized until some time after casualties occur.
- There may be a delay in identifying the chemical or biological agent present and in determining the appropriate protective measures.
- The chemical or biological agent may quickly dissipate or may be long-acting and persistent.
- Investigation of the cause of the event and those responsible for it are important law enforcement activities.
- Resources for combating terrorist attacks exist in local, state, and federal governments.
- Recovery can be complicated by the presence of persistent agents, additional threats, extensive physical damages, and psychological stress.
- Critical medical facilities could become contaminated.
- Horry County and the state of South Carolina could be quickly overwhelmed by an event.

#### **IV. RESPONSIBILITIES.**

##### **A. HORRY COUNTY.**

1. County Attorney.
  - Advise on legal matters pertaining to terrorist acts.
  - Prosecute violators.
  - Prepare emergency declarations, proclamations, and orders.
2. Courts.
  - Expand court operations in order to expedite the processing of the increased number of cases presented for hearing as a result of the event.
  - Provide, if possible, a temporary location where court functions will be carried out.
  - Provide court clerical personnel to assist in preparing charges as required.

3. County Council, Municipal Mayors, City Councils.
  - Establish policy, promulgate plans, and declare emergencies, issue emergency orders, enact emergency legislation as required.
  - Maintain control of county and city departments, personnel, resources during the crisis and consequence management phases.
  - Request state and federal assistance through Horry County EMD as required.

Pertaining to Civil Disturbance, Unrest:

- Keep lines of communications open with community leaders.
- Schedule meetings with community leaders to negotiate differences.

4. Horry County Emergency Management Department.
  - Lead agency for consequence management.
  - Develop, maintain emergency plans.
  - Develop training, exercising program.
  - Activate, manage Emergency Operations Center (EOC).
  - Advise on declaration of emergency and emergency orders.
  - Coordinate continuity of government / continuity of operations through the EOC.
  - Notify, alert, and warn departments, agencies, general public of the situation.
  - Mobilize resources.
  - Liaison, coordinate with state, federal, private organizations.
5. Fire Department.
  - Establish on-site liaison at the Law Enforcement Command Post.
  - Coordinate dispatch policies with EOC.
  - Receive clearance from Law Enforcement to enter the affected areas.
  - Conduct on-site operations relating to safety, security, and crime scene protection under the direction of the Law Enforcement Command Post.
  - Operate with fire suppression strategy as directed by the EOC and the Fire Command Officer at the scene.
  - Provide emergency medical services, urban search and rescue, hazmat response, etc., as permitted by safety and security precautions.
  - Assume special assignments as determined by the Fire representative at the EOC.
6. Health Department, Hospitals
  - Monitors and investigates public health threats.
  - Initiates public health alerts and emergencies
  - Provide health services as permitted by safety and security precautions.
  - Provide mental health / stress management support to responders and victims.
  - The local health authority establishes quarantines within Montgomery.
7. Emergency Medical Services (Fire Rescue).
  - Provide emergency medical services as permitted by safety and security precautions.
  - Maintains and operates radiological and chemical detection equipment and provides:
    - On scene triage for both uncontaminated and potentially contaminated victims.
    - Hospital notification procedures.
    - Victim tracking.
    - Hospital loading procedures.
    - Isolation and decontamination procedures.
    - Temporary morgue.

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8. Law Enforcement Agencies.
    - Lead agency for crisis management.
    - Establish and maintain close liaison with state and federal law enforcement agencies.
    - Collect and disseminate information and intelligence.
    - Provide intelligence and "crisis monitoring" for terrorist acts.
    - Prevent acts of terrorism.
    - Warn the public of any potentially dangerous situation.
    - Secure critical facilities as the situation warrants.
    - Respond to acts of terrorism.
    - Establish incident command or unified command structure.
    - Direct, control law enforcement forces deployed to site of emergency.
    - Establish, maintain communications with the EOC.
    - Provide or request "specialty teams" as required for the various acts of terrorism.
    - Control access and provide security in damaged or evacuated areas.
    - Investigate terrorist incidents.
    - Arrest violators.
    - Build a police organization response and resources.
    - Utilize bomb squad as appropriate.
    - Likely tasks:
      - Perimeter establishment and manning.
      - Access control.
      - Establishing ingress/egress routes.
      - Crime scene procedures.
      - Establish initial response structure.
      - Fatality disposition.
  9. Public Information Officer (PIO).
    - Obtain information about the incident from Law Enforcement PIO and other sources.
    - Prepare official news releases.
    - Manage media logistics.
    - Work through Horry County EOC structure.
  10. Public Transportation.
    - Assist and cooperate with Law Enforcement in detouring bus routes.
    - Provide emergency transportation as required by the situation.
    - In emergency situations involving public transportation vehicles, provide radio contact to the affected vehicle and assist, if requested, in locating the vehicle.
  11. Public Works.
    - Assist with traffic control and evacuation as necessary.
    - Provide barricades for scene control.
    - Provide debris clearance.
    - Likely tasks:
      - Securing, restoring vital services.
      - Transportation.
    - Organization and resources.
  12. Volunteer Organizations.
    - Provide services in support of human needs.
  13. Water and Sewer Agencies.

- Provide security at water treatment plants, pumping stations and reservoirs with assistance of Law Enforcement and outside contractors as necessary.
- Fill reservoirs to capacity as appropriate.
- Shut down water service where necessary.
- Provide domestic water in areas where normal service has been disrupted by whatever means possible.

14. COBRA Team

- Augment the local emergency services and emergency management officials with enhanced training, personnel protective equipment, and basic detection equipment.
- Identify on a limited basis the presence of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) materials/agents and advise first responders and the incident commander on protective actions.
- Provide relevant information on, assist, and/or conduct decontamination operations.
- Provide information on, assist, and/or conduct medical management operations including triage, treatment, decontamination, transportation, and hospital support.
- Assist and/or conduct law enforcement functions including intelligence, team security, scene security and containment, evidence control and coordination with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.
- Provide communications capability with individual team members and coordinate communications with the incident commander and other cobra teams.
- Provide logistical support to the COBRA team including procurement, distribution, maintenance, and replacement of equipment and personnel.
- Integrate operations with other COBRA Response Teams at an incident location.
- The objectives of the Advanced COBRA Response Team (ACRT) program are to establish and maintain a team of qualified individuals who can execute the following:
  - Operate independently in an environment that may contain nuclear/radiological, biological, or chemical (NBC) materials/agents.
  - Conduct scene reconnaissance, identify, and, in some cases, quantify the presence of NBC materials/agents, and advise first responders and the incident commander on protective actions.
  - Assist and/or implement victim rescue/extraction.
  - Provide information on, assist and/or conduct decontamination operations.
  - Provide information on, assist, and/or conduct medical management operations including triage, treatment, decontamination, transportation, mass care, and hospital support.
  - Assist and/or conduct law enforcement functions including intelligence, team security, scene security and containment, evidence control and coordination with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.
  - Provide FBI certified Hazardous Devices Technicians to conduct ordnance recognition and Render Safe Procedures (RSP), and to act independently or in conjunction with other teams that operate in a chemical, biological, and/or nuclear/radiological atmosphere.
  - Provide communications capability with individual team members and coordinate communications with the incident commander and other COBRA Response Teams.
  - Provide logistical support to the COBRA Response Team including procurement, distribution, maintenance, and replacement of equipment and personnel.
  - Integrate operations with other COBRA Response Teams at an incident location.

**B. STATE.**

**Primary Agency.**

1. South Carolina State Law Enforcement Division (SLED).
  - Appoint a SLED on-site commander to provide leadership and direction for the state crisis management response.
  - Maintain coordination with the FBI.
  - Issue and track the status of crisis management actions assigned to state agencies.
  - Designate and assign the appropriate liaison and advisory personnel to support SCEMD.
  - Determine when a threat of an act of terrorism warrants consultation with the Governor's Office.
  - Coordinate the state crisis management response with the lead federal and local crisis management agencies.

### **Support Agencies**

2. South Carolina Emergency Management Division (SCEMD).
  - Formulate incident action plans, define priorities, review status, resolve conflicts, and identify issues that require decisions from higher authorities, and evaluate the need for additional resources.
  - Issue and track the status of consequence management actions assigned to state agencies. A common system should be used by SLED and SCEMD to provide a capability to control, prioritize, de-conflict, and as appropriate, to audit tasks given to state agencies.
  - Track the status of federal assistance requests.
  - Establish/ activate the SCEOC.
  - Establish Mobile Command Post (MCP).
  - Establish a state joint information center.
  - Keep the Governor's Office informed.
  - Coordinate local support requests with state and federal agencies.
  - In the event of a terrorist incident, a SCEMD representative will report to the Incident command Post to coordinate state support as requested by local the EMD. This same representative will assist in assessing needs beyond the state's capabilities and begin coordinating requests for federal assistance.
3. South Carolina Department of Mental Health.
  - Provide intervention/treatment for:
    - People who were not exposed, but believe that they been exposed to the agent used in WMD.
    - People who suffer severe emotional distress as a result of the incident.
4. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC).
  - Send an assessment team to aid in contaminant identification.
  - Serve as the chief medical authority for the state.
  - Coordinates and manages public health services and resources if the Governor activates the State Emergency Operations Center and declares a state of emergency.
  - Assesses potential volume of patients, the capabilities and capacity of local hospitals to receive patients, and identify back-up hospitals for overflow.
  - Determines the number and health personnel needed to treat victims and the availability and methods of procuring additional personnel.
  - Assists overall operation in dispatching volunteer health department workers to needed areas.
  - Assists local health departments in detecting potentially disease outbreaks and implementing control measures.
  - Assists in the dissemination of information to the public and health service.
  - Provides information to the Department of Human Resources on urgent needs that voluntary relief agencies can meet.

- Advise responders on evacuation or sheltering in place.
- Advise responders on provisions for quarantine of people exposed to an agent.
- Advise responders on prophylaxis issues.
- Advise medical facilities on provisions to administer vaccines.
- Advise responders on triage of people that were exposed to an agent.
- Advise responders on personnel decontamination issues.
- Advise medical facilities on provisions for expedient decontamination.
- Assist in determining suitable disposal of remains.

Environmental Management (SCDHEC).

- Advise responders on property and equipment decontamination issues.
- Advise responders in determining suitable disposal of contaminated equipment.
- Monitor water quality and sanitary conditions in the area affected.
- Determine stay-time limits for those who must wear protective gear.
- Assist with decontamination of emergency workers.

5. Board of Funeral Services.
  - Assist in the recovery of contaminated remains.
  - Assist in suitable disposal of contaminated remains.
6. South Carolina National Guard.
  - Assist in securing impacted area.
  - Provide detection and decontamination teams.
  - Assist mortuary teams.
  - Assist with communications and logistics.
  - Assist in damage assessment.

**C. FEDERAL.**

1. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5).

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5) serves as the guiding policy document for domestic incident management "to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, the U.S. Government shall establish a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management. In these efforts, with regard to domestic incidents, the U.S. Government treats crisis management and consequence management as a single, integrated function, rather than two separate functions. The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federal official for domestic incident management."

2. National Response Plan (NRP).

The purpose of the National Response Plan (NRP) is to harmonize the operational processes, procedures, and protocols detailed in such documents as the Federal Response Plan, U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Mass Migration Emergency Plan (Distant Shore), and National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan with the strategic direction provided in HSPD-5 until such plans can be integrated into the full NRP.

This Initial NRP implements, on an interim basis, the domestic incident management authorities, roles, and responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland Security as defined in HSPD-5. It also serves as a "bridging document" between the current family of Federal incident management and emergency

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response plans and a full NRP to be developed by the Secretary in collaboration with other Federal departments and agencies and State, tribal, local, and nongovernmental partners.

3. Secretary of Homeland Security.

The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federal official for domestic incident management. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary is responsible for coordinating Federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The Secretary shall coordinate the Federal Government's resources utilized in response to or recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies if and when any one of the following four conditions applies: (1) a Federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary; (2) the resources of State and local authorities are overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate State and local authorities; (3) more than one Federal department or agency has become substantially involved in responding to the incident; or (4) the Secretary has been directed to assume responsibility for managing the domestic incident by the President.

4. The National Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC).

This is the primary national-level hub for operational communications and information pertaining to domestic incident management. Located at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) headquarters, the HSOC integrates and provides overall steady state threat monitoring and situational awareness for domestic incident management on a 24/7 basis. The HSOC comprises representatives from other Federal departments and agencies as required to support steady state threat-monitoring requirements, as well as domestic incident management activities. The HSOC serves as the Homeland Security

Secretary's primary point of coordination for the following activities:

- Maintaining domestic incident management operational situational awareness, including threat monitoring and initial incident information assessment.
- Facilitating homeland security information-sharing and operational coordination with other emergency operations centers at the Federal, State, local, and tribal levels, as well as emergency operations centers managed by nongovernmental entities.
- Disseminating or coordinating the dissemination of homeland security threat warnings, advisory bulletins, and other information pertinent to national incident management.
- Providing general situational awareness and support to and acting upon requests for information generated by the Interagency Incident Management Group.
- Facilitating domestic incident awareness, prevention, deterrence, and response and recovery activities, as well as direction to Department of Homeland Security components. (Note: In the case of a law enforcement response, the Attorney General retains the lead and the Secretary of Homeland Security will facilitate required actions, consistent with their respective authorities.)

5. Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG).

Comprised of senior representatives from DHS components and other Federal departments and agencies and nongovernmental organizations, as required, the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) located at DHS headquarters:

- Facilitates national-level domestic incident management and coordination.
- Serves as the focal point for Federal headquarters-level operational coordination of a domestic

incident.

- Reviews and validates threat assessments and making recommendations to the Secretary on actions to take in response to credible threats, including changes in the National Homeland Security Advisory System alert level.
- Synthesizes information and framing issues for the Secretary or other appropriate officials.
- Recommends priorities to the Secretary for the use or allocation of Federal resources in support of domestic incident management;
- Provides general oversight of the application of Federal resources in support of domestic incident management in coordination with existing agency and interagency resource management and private sector entities.
- Provides strategic situational awareness and decision support across the full spectrum of domestic incident management domains, to include awareness, prevention, protection, response, and recovery.
- Anticipates evolving Federal resource and operational requirements according to the specifics of the situation at hand.

6. Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.

The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security is responsible for interagency policy coordination regarding domestic incident management, as directed by the President.

7. Principal Federal Official (PFO).

A Principal Federal Official (PFO) may be appointed to represent the DHS Secretary at the incident. The roles and responsibilities of the PFO include the following:

- Representing the Secretary of Homeland Security as the senior Federal official on scene to enable the Secretary to carry out his role as the principal Federal official for domestic incident management.
- Ensuring overall coordination of Federal domestic incident management activities and resource allocation on scene, ensuring the seamless integration of Federal incident management activities in support of State, local, and tribal requirements.
- Providing strategic guidance to Federal entities and facilitating interagency conflict resolution as necessary to enable timely Federal assistance to State, local, and tribal authorities.
- Serving as a primary, although not exclusive, point for Federal interface with State, local, and tribal government officials, the media, and the private sector for incident management.
- Providing real-time incident information, through the support of the Federal incident management structure on scene, as detailed in the Federal Response Plan and other Federal incident management and emergency operations plans, to the Secretary of Homeland Security through the HSOC and the IIMG, as required.
- Coordinating the overall Federal public communications strategy at the State, local, and tribal levels and clearing Federal interagency communications to the public regarding the incident.

8. The National Response Plan states: "federal incident management officials designated in existing plans will maintain their authorities and responsibilities as defined in the federal response plan and other existing plans, statutes, and presidential directives." The response to a terrorist threat or incident within the U.S. will require a highly coordinated, multi- agency local, state, and federal response. In support of this mission, the following primary federal agencies will provide the core federal response:

- a. Department of Justice (DOJ)/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Department of Justice (Prosecution)

- Ensures the development and implementation of policies directed at preventing terrorist attacks domestically.
- Undertakes the criminal prosecution of these acts of terrorism that violate U.S. law.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (Investigation)

- Serves as lead federal agency (LFA) for the management of a federal response to terrorist incidents that take place within U.S. territory or those occurring in international waters that do not involve a foreign flag vessel.
  - Executes any federal operational response and acts as the federal on-scene commander ensuring, appropriate coordination of the federal response with state and local authorities.
  - May form and coordinate the deployment of a Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) with other agencies, when appropriate, and seek appropriate federal support based on the nature of the situation.
- b. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (Recovery)
- Ensures that the Federal Response Plan (FRP) with its Terrorism Incident Annex is adequate to respond to the consequences of terrorism directed against populations in the United States, including terrorism involving WMD.
  - As the lead federal agency for consequence management, supports the FBI with the planning and execution of functions undertaken to respond to the consequences of a terrorist use of a WMD.
  - Designates appropriate liaison and advisory personnel for the Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) and deployment with the DEST, the Joint Operations Center (JOC), and the Joint Information Center (JIC).
  - Directs and coordinates any federal emergency response in accordance with its statutory authorities to ensure appropriate coordination of federal response activities in support of State and local authorities.
- c. Department of Defense (DOD). (Protection)
- Provides military assistance to the LFA and/or Federal Response Plan Emergency Support Function primary agencies during all aspects of a terrorist incident upon approval by the Secretary of Defense.
  - DOD assistance could include threat assessment, DEST deployment, technical advice, operational support, tactical operations, support for civil disturbances, and custody, transportation and disposal of a WMD device.
- d. Department of Energy (DOE). (Technical Advise)
- Provides scientific-technical personnel and equipment in support of the LFA during all aspects of a nuclear/radiological WMD terrorist incident.
  - Supports both crisis and consequence management activities with capabilities such as threat assessment, DEST deployment, LFA advisory requirements, technical advice, forecasted modeling predictions, and operational support to include direct support of tactical operations.
  - Deployable DOE scientific technical assistance and support includes capabilities such as search operations; access operations; diagnostic and device assessment; radiological assessment and monitoring; identification of material; development of federal protective action recommendations; provision of information on the radiological response; render safe operations; hazards assessment; containment, relocation and storage of special nuclear material evidence; post-incident clean-up; and on-site management and radiological assessment to the public, the White House, and members of Congress and foreign governments.

- e. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). (Environmental Impact)
  - Provides technical personnel and supporting equipment to the LFA during all aspects of a WMD terrorist incident.
  - EPA assistance may include threat assessment, DEST and regional emergency response team deployment, LFA advisory requirements, technical advice and operational support.
  - EPA assistance and advice includes threat assessment, consultation, agent identification, hazard detection and reduction, environmental monitoring; sample and forensic evidence collection/analysis; assessment and cleanup; identification of contaminants; and on-site safety, protection, prevention, and decontamination activities.
  - EPA and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) share responsibilities for response to oil discharges into navigable waters and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants into the environment under the NCP. EPA provides the predesignated Federal On-Scene Coordinator for inland areas and the USCG for coastal areas to coordinate containment, removal, and disposal efforts and resources during an oil, hazardous substance, or WMD incident.
  
- f. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). (Biological Impact)
  - Primary agency under the Federal Response Plan for the provision of health, medical, and health-related social services.
  - Provides technical personnel and supporting equipment to the LFA during all aspects of a terrorist incident. HHS assistance could support threat assessment, DEST deployment, epidemiological investigation, pharmaceutical support operations, LFA advisory requirements, technical advice and operational (public health) medical and mental health services support. Technical assistance and advice includes identification of contaminants, sample collection and analysis, on-site safety and protection activities, medical management plans, and the provision of health and medical care and mass fatality management. The PHS would activate the National Disaster Medical System to support local and State authorities in the delivery of direct medical care in the form of pre-hospital treatment, hospital evacuation, and in-hospital care to incident casualties.

## **V. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.**

### **A. GENERAL CONCEPTS.**

1. Antiterrorism.
  - a. Antiterrorism involves the measures taken by facilities, organizations or individuals to reduce the probability of their becoming a victim of terrorism. Educational programs, physical security, personal protection techniques, and operational patterns are all passive means of making potential targets less appealing to terrorists
  - b. Vital components of an antiterrorism program include: information and intelligence gathering, development and implementation of preventive measures, in-depth planning, and specialized training.
  
2. Counterterrorism.
  - a. Counterterrorism is the full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. This includes direct contact with the terrorist force or its representative to end the incident with minimum disruption or loss of life and property. Participation in counterterrorism actions is generally limited to those forces with special training and expertise.

b. This begins "crisis" and "consequence" management actions. See next paragraph.

3. "Crisis" and "Consequence" Management.

This Plan introduces two emergency management terms that are unique to terrorism. These terms describe how the response to people committing an act of terrorism (crisis management) and the response to potential or actual effects of that activity (consequence management) will occur.

a. Crisis Management.

- Crisis management is the law enforcement response to the causes of terrorist incidents, terrorists and their weapons. It includes measures to identify, acquire and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, isolate, prevent and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.
- The federal government exercises preeminent authority and responsibility in crisis management. The federal crisis management effort is lead by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with assistance from other federal, state, and local agencies as necessary. Final authority to make decisions on scene regarding the causes of the incident, such as securing the scene perimeter, identifying and rendering weapons safe, and capturing terrorists rests with the FBI's on-scene commander (FBI OSC).
- However, local and state law enforcement agencies will in all likelihood establish the initial command and undertake the initial response to the incident.
- The Horry County Law Enforcement and/or appropriate municipal Police Department(s) will coordinate directly with the FBI for the crisis management of terrorist incidents.

b. Consequence Management.

- Consequence management addresses the consequences of terrorism, the effects upon people, property and communities. It includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to government, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.
- Horry County will exercise preeminent authority to make decisions regarding the consequences of terrorism. This authority will normally rest with the incident commander and the Emergency Operations Center Command Staff. FEMA coordinates federal agency consequence management support as per the Federal Response Plan, marshaling federal resources through the state emergency operations center (EOC) in support of the local government.
- State and local governments will most likely be the first to respond to the consequences of terrorism; the federal government will provide assistance, as required. State and local agencies may have authorities that overlap federal jurisdictions.
- Horry County Emergency Management will coordinate consequence management with state and federal governments, mutual aid partners, industries, private citizens, and others.

4. Incident Management and Unified Command.

Horry County uses the Incident Command System (ICS) as the structure to manage emergency events

at the field level. ICS incorporates the concept of unified command when more than one agency is responsible for the emergency event. This system allows agencies to exercise their responsibilities without compromising jurisdictional authorities.

5. In a terrorist incident, the area of operations is potentially a crime scene and a hazardous materials site and a disaster area - spanning the borders of several local jurisdictions. In order to organize a complex on-scene operation, operational boundaries need to be defined with common terminology and procedures for officials responding to the crime, the hazardous materials incident, and the disaster. Operational boundaries may be used to control access to the area, target public information messages, assign operational sectors among responding organizations, and assess potential impacts on the population and the environment. The physical location of these boundaries will depend on the type and quantity of hazardous materials involved:
  - a. The Crime Scene Boundary defines the crime scene. The crime scene may include the areas which are referred to in technical operations as the "working point" or "red zone." Access to the crime scene may be restricted by law enforcement. Response activities within the crime scene may require special procedures in order to protect evidence collection.
  - b. The Hazardous Materials Boundary defines the hazardous materials site, which may be referred to in technical operations as the "hot" or "isolation zones". Depending on the spread of contaminants, the HAZMAT site may include some portion of the crime scene and the surrounding community. Access to the HAZMAT site may be restricted to response personnel wearing protective clothing and using decontamination procedures.
  - c. The Disaster Boundary identifies the community-at-risk, which may need to take protective actions such as shelter, evacuation or quarantine. Access into this area may or may not be restricted on the authority of health officials.

## **B. THREAT ANALYSIS AND NOTIFICATIONS.**

1. Receipt of Threat, Initial County Response.
  - a. If a threat is received at the municipal, county, state or federal level, the threat will be conveyed by the involved municipal Police Department and County law enforcement, or the Horry County Emergency Management to the appropriate law enforcement agency within that level. Threat information will also be shared between law enforcement agencies at appropriate municipal county, state and federal levels.
  - b. The first assessment will most probably be made by the involved Police Department, Fire Department or a member of an emergency response agency. Unless that department has specific information which would discount the credibility of the threat, a response should follow. This may be as simple as consulting with other parties, to a physical response to the location threatened. The involved Police Department will take actions that they feel are prudent based on their assessment of the threat, the knowledge of the target, etc. This may range from evacuation, negotiation, tactical intervention, Explosive Ordnance Disposal procedures, etc., as dictated by the situation.
  - c. The involved Police Department will notify the South Carolina Department of Public Safety and the FBI either directly or through the Horry County Emergency Management Department.
  - d. Additionally, once notified, Horry County Emergency Management will notify municipal and county departments as appropriate.

2. Horry County Response and Credible WMD Threat Alert Levels.

Horry County will use standard operating procedures and the following FBI four threat alert levels to describe a developing potential Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) condition/situation and to initiate the suggested response for the designated threat level.

**a. THREAT LEVEL 4 - MINIMAL THREAT**

DESCRIPTION: Received threats do not warrant actions beyond normal liaison notifications or placing assets or resources on a heightened alert (agencies are operating under normal day-to-day conditions).

Threat Level 4 - Local Response:

- 1) Communicate status to appropriate agencies utilizing the notification SOP.

If available, a written notice/incident report will be issued to the Police Dept, and appropriate county and municipal fire, police, and health departments, and appropriate hospital emergency rooms.

**b. THREAT LEVEL 3 - POTENTIAL THREAT**

DESCRIPTION: Intelligence or an articulated threat indicates a potential for a terrorist incident. However, this threat has not yet been assessed as credible and will initiate the credibility assessment process.

Threat Level 3 - Local Response:

- 1) Establish, maintain communication to appropriate agencies utilizing the Notification SOP;
- 2) Follow EOP & SOP's as appropriate;
- 3) As a part of the on-going contingency planning process during the developing crisis, response and deployment plans for resources should be made, should they be required.

**c. THREAT LEVEL 2 - CREDIBLE THREAT**

DESCRIPTION: A threat assessment indicates that the potential threat is credible, and confirms the involvement of WMD in the developing terrorist incident. Intelligence will vary with each threat, and will impact the level of the response. At this threat level, the situation requires the tailoring of response actions to use resources available to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve the crisis.

The Federal response, led by the FBI, will focus on law enforcement actions taken in the interest of public safety and welfare, and is predominantly concerned with preventing and resolving the threat. Consequence management planning and pre-positioning of tailored resources will occur, as required.

An increase in the threat significance occurs due to the identification of an explosive device or WMD device capable of causing a significant destructive event, prior to actual injury or loss. This is either confirmed or intelligence and circumstances indicate a high probability that a device exists. In this case, the threat has developed into a WMD terrorist situation requiring an immediate process to identify, acquire, and plan the use of Federal and State resources to augment local

resources in response to the potential consequence of a terrorist use of WMD.

Threat Level 2 - Local Response:

- 1) Confirm Level 2 Alert;
- 2) Ensure response agencies are aware of situation utilizing the Notification SOP;
- 3) Maintain communication to appropriate agencies;
- 4) Anticipate the use of Unified Command;
- 5) Follow EOP & SOP's as appropriate;
- 6) Increase staffing, as necessary, call back/hold over personnel to meet needs;
- 7) Pre-identify staging areas;
- 8) Obtain most current intelligence/situation reports;
- 9) Place liaison(s) at Command Post, as necessary;
- 10) Monitor all activity within the impacted area;
- 11) Review procedures for the following: Personal protective equipment, shelter/evacuation operations, mass casualty operations, hazardous materials response operations, and general safety; and
- 12) Develop communication's plans for major areas of the incident.

**d. THREAT LEVEL 1 - A WMD INCIDENT HAS OCCURRED**

DESCRIPTION: A WMD Terrorism incident has occurred which requires an immediate process to identify, acquire, and plan the use of Federal resources to augment State and local resources in response to limited or major consequences of a terrorist use of WMD.

Conditions for Level 1:

- No warning - the device or terrorist act is underway without any pre-notification and/or threatening communication.
- The incident has resulted in mass casualties.
- The initial response may have been dispatched under normal operating procedures without knowledge of potential NBC devices and before a terrorist act was known to have occurred.
- All normal operations are suspended in the impact areas.
- Unified command utilized for impact area operations.

Follow all guidelines and procedures for WMD operations:

- All potential chemical, biological, or nuclear material should be approached by authorized trained and equipped response personnel only, to include, but not limited to: COBRA Team, and Investigation Units or Technical Escort Units (under the direction of the COBRA Team).
- Unless trained and properly equipped with personal protective equipment, NO field personnel should enter or inspect the impact area due to risk for exposure to known or suspected chemical, biological, or nuclear materials.
- Field monitoring and transportation of samples to lab testing is coordinated with COBRA Team.

Threat Level 1- Local Response:

- 1) Confirm Level 1 Alert and communicate to all responding agencies;
- 2) Communicate information on staging areas and incident command post location;
- 3) Communicate boundaries of identified impact area, and update as needed;

- 4) Record actions on scene and prepare for briefings;
- 5) Coordinate with agencies at the command post;
- 6) Identify location of units in field;
- 7) Continue assessment of incident status and threat to human life and property;
- 8) Confirm areas that are secure from danger and safe to enter; and
- 9) Elements of the Horry County EMD Emergency Management Plan will guide general terrorist incident response actions.

### 3. Initial State Actions.

- a. The South Carolina Office of Homeland Security (SLED) and South Carolina Emergency Management Division will receive, either directly or through the state's 24-hour warning point at the state EOC, then verify, and coordinate all initial notifications of incidents including those from the federal government, local governments, industries, private citizens and other sources.
- b. The South Carolina Emergency Management Division has developed a protocol which will enable agencies to call one number to ensure that appropriate state agencies and the FBI are notified of a threat or incident. In addition to such notifications, the South Carolina Emergency Management Division will ensure that appropriate state agencies communicate on a regular basis to enable the most appropriate state response, if appropriate.
- c. The South Carolina Office of Homeland Security (SLED) will declare a "level of threat."
- d. Information on the threat and state actions is forwarded to the FBI.
- e. The South Carolina Emergency Management will continue to monitor the situation and coordinate potential resource needs with local, state and federal agencies.

### 4. Threat Documentation.

- a. A WMD or other terrorist act threat may be transmitted in several forms. The threat must be carefully documented since they are useful in threat assessment and formulating the appropriate response. Threat documentation is also necessary as an evidence collection tool to assist the investigation of such threats.
- b. In the event of a written threat, or statement following an incident, the original message should be immediately turned over to the involved Police Department for preservation as evidence.
- c. If a tape has been made of the message it should be submitted as soon as possible to the Police Department or the FBI.
- d. Threats received electronically should be left intact and maintained as evidence.

### 5. Initial Federal Actions.

- a. If the incident has been identified as a terrorist act, and notifications made, the local office of the FBI may initiate a response. This will generally be in proportion to the perceived significance of the threat, and the extent to which FBI has jurisdiction. If the initial assessment warrants, the FBI will begin a formal threat assessment process. This involves a joint assessment by experts, combining knowledge of psychological factors, historic and intelligence records, and technical factors such as weapons and methods - all aimed at establishing the credibility of the threat.

- b. Throughout this process, the FBI will act in concert and consultation with the involved Police Department and the state. Assuming the threat is deemed credible, the FBI will work with the involved Police Department and state government to begin actions designed to neutralize the threat and/or to deal with its consequences. Depending on the nature and gravity of the threat, this may range from telephonic consultation to activation of the Horry County Emergency Operations Center.

#### **D. THREAT EXECUTED/EVENT OCCURS.**

##### 1. General.

- If there is no threat, and an act occurs, most of the steps indicated above occur in more rapid succession - or almost simultaneously. When the event occurs, response is largely dependent on the nature of the act and the dimensions of its impact. For a time, crisis and consequence response occur on a simultaneous basis. The critical decision must be made whether to turn the location of the event into a crime scene. While lifesaving and life safety are always the pre-eminent considerations, every effort must be made to contain the scene, limit access, and preserve that which remains.
- Assuming the scene is eventually stabilized, law enforcement, federal, local, or some combination thereof, will act to secure the perimeter(s) of the area; locate, process, preserve, and store the evidence; and deal with any human remains that may be involved. These activities may be supported by other entities ranging from the fire service to public works. At some point the crisis phase ceases. Meanwhile, the Horry County Emergency management Department, using the tenets of the Incident Management System, will continue to work to deal with the consequences of the act.

2. Once an incident has occurred, the nature and magnitude of the incident will determine the degree of the Horry County response and the amount of state and federal assistance required. Initial municipal/county actions will include declaring a state of emergency and requesting state/federal assistance.
3. Upon declaring an emergency, the involved municipality and **Horry County** assumes responsibility for actions taken to control terrorist acts within its jurisdictional limits. Operational control and direction is maintained through the Horry County Emergency Operations Center in direct communications with the field command post(s).

#### **E. REQUEST FOR STATE ASSISTANCE AND RESPONSE.**

1. All requests for state assistance will be coordinated with the State EOC.
2. Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).
  - a. In the event of a terrorist attack or a major natural disaster, supplies of critical medical items in Horry County will be rapidly depleted. In anticipation, the Federal Government established the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) to augment local supplies of critical medical items. The SNS is managed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and contains large quantities of medicines, antidotes, and medical supplies needed to respond to a wide range of expected problems or scenarios. Potential scenarios include attacks using nerve agents, such as sarin, and

biological agents, such as anthrax, plague, and tularemia.

- b. The SNS has two components designed to arrive in separate phases. The first phase is referred to as a 12-hour Push Package, and accordingly will arrive at the requesting location within 12 hours of the federal decision to deploy it. The Push Package contains nearly 50 tons of material that can be used to address a wide range of expected threats. The second phase is referred to as vendor managed inventory (VMI) and contains large quantities of specific items, such as antibiotics and ventilators, needed to address an identified need. Various manufacturers store and manage these materials until they are requested through the SNS program.
- c. Horry County will request deployment of the SNS 12-hour Push Package from CDC through the state EOC as soon as local officials (in consultation with state officials) determine that it is necessary to do so to protect the public health.
- d. Horry County will request, receive, manage, repackage, and distribute the SNS to those who need it.

## **VI. HORRY COUNTY RESPONSE ACTIONS**

NOTE: Refer to the Municipal and County Fire Department Hazardous Materials Response Plans for additional information on first responder procedures.

### **A. SCENE CONTROL: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS.**

NOTE: *Refer to Attachment 2, "Specific Terrorism Hazards: Response Tactics, Personnel Protective Measures and Casualty Treatment."*

- Effectively implement scene control and ensure public safety.
- Quickly and accurately evaluate the incident area.
- Determine the severity of danger.
- Isolate the danger.
- Establishing control (work) zones.
- Considerations:
  - Terrorists may still be nearby waiting for responders to arrive, or could be among the injured.
  - Anticipate the potential for multiple hazard locations. Define outer and inner operational perimeters. There may exist several hazards within the outer perimeter that must be isolated, especially when victims are scattered throughout the boundaries of the incident, or multiple targets contain dangers.
  - Controlling the scene, isolating hazards and attempting to conduct controlled evacuations will be resource intensive. Inordinate security may be needed for the event, so request additional assistance early.
  - After a bombing, access to the scene may be limited due to rubble or debris. Law Enforcement

activity may make it difficult to establish access and exit avenues for operations.

## **B. PERIMETER CONTROL.**

- It is better to overestimate the perimeter than underestimate, it is easier to reduce the perimeter instead of increasing it after operations are set up.
- The outer perimeter is the most distant control point or boundary of the incident. It is used to restrict all public access to the incident.
- The inner perimeter isolates known hazards within the outer perimeter. It is used to control the movement of responders.
- Establish the standard "control zones" within the outer perimeter. These zones include the:
  - Hot (exclusion) zone (exceptional access);
  - Warm zone (contamination reduction corridor); and
  - Cold (support) zone (staging area).

## **C. PUBLIC PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS.**

1. Evacuation. The types of information that should be considered in the decision to evacuate should include the following:
  - The degree or severity of public dangers or threats as a result of the hazard.
  - The number of individuals or population area affected by the hazard.
  - Availability of the resources needed to evacuate the affected population including:
    - Additional fire/EMS/police personnel.
    - Transportation vehicles including school buses, privately-owned vehicles or public mass transit.
  - Means available to notify the public and provide emergency instructions before and during the evacuation, including:
    - Local broadcast media (Emergency Alert System).
    - NOAA Weather Radio.
    - Route alerting via mobile address systems.
    - Sirens.
    - Door to door alerting.
  - Safe passage for the evacuees, including:
    - Adequate time and opportunity to conduct the evacuation.
    - Evacuation route monitoring.
    - Ability to reroute traffic due to congestion.
    - Availability of shelters.

- Special needs of the evacuees:
    - The need to assist special facilities (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, prisons) in evacuating.
    - The need to alert and warn the hearing impaired and provide evacuation assistance to the mobility impaired.
  - The ability to provide shelter and sustenance to evacuees including:
    - Adequately staffed shelters with feeding and lavatory facilities.
    - The provision of medical care to evacuees in need.
2. Shelter-in-place. Shelter-in-place is the advising of the affected population to remain indoors and seek protection within the structure that they occupy or in a nearby structure. The decision to shelter-in-place is based upon the analysis of the hazard. If the danger to the public is determined to be less by shelter-in-place, rather than by evacuating, then shelter-in-place should be carried out. With certain hazards (i.e., short term airborne chemical or radiation hazards or line-of-sight exposure to explosives) the best decision may be to shelter-in-place. Distinct advantages of shelter-in-place over evacuation are the relative short time and ease of implementation. Remember, as long as there remains a danger, hazards and risks must be continuously evaluated. When considering shelter-in-place include the following:
- The risks of shelter-in-place vs. evacuation.
  - The availability of resources.
  - The time available to take protective action.
  - The level of public understanding of the shelter-in-place concept.

For explosion, shelter-in-place can be enhanced by seeking the most protective refuge in the structure. For chemical, radiation, and some biological hazards, shelter-in-place may be enhanced by reducing the indoor-outdoor air exchange rate.

3. Combination of Both Protective Actions. There may be circumstances when using both evacuation and shelter-in-place would be appropriate. For example, when time or resources cannot support the immediate need to evacuate a large population, only those closest to the hazard, and at the greatest danger, could be instructed to evacuate, while people not in the immediate area would be advised to shelter-in-place.

#### **D. SCENE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS.**

- The agency assigned site security responsibilities will likely vary according to the location and scope of the incident and the resources available.
- Whenever there is an ongoing or unstable criminal activity present, law enforcement officials should dictate security measures for scene control.
- As the incident becomes more defined and more stable (intermediate phase), the shift from a combination of police and other (non-police) personnel in control of the perimeter should begin to transition to all law enforcement.
- If the incident is of such magnitude that response activities may continue for days, the use of National Guard units should be considered for perimeter security and control. National Guard support can only

be obtained if requested through the South Carolina Emergency Management.

#### **E. TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS.**

NOTE: *Refer to Attachment 2, "Specific Terrorism Hazards: Response Tactics, Personnel Protective Measures and Casualty Treatment."*

- Always approach the scene utilizing protective clothing and equipment.
- Be alert for outward warning signs that may indicate the type of danger present, such as:
  - Casualties resulting from no apparent reason.
  - Signs and symptoms indicating chemical exposure.
  - Obvious signs of criminal activity, such as weapons on the scene.
  - Suspicious vehicles or packages.
  - Pre-incident verbal or written warnings.
- Properly stage vehicles.
  - If practical, position first-in vehicles and responders upwind and uphill.
  - Direct supporting responders to approach from upwind and uphill.
  - Avoid 'stacking' vehicles where they interfere with each other's evacuation route.
  - Avoid line-of-sight staging with suspected explosive devices.
  - Strictly enforce staging instructions.
  - Consider having vehicles back into position so that they may leave the scene quickly.
- Avoid vapor clouds, mist and unknown liquid.
- Initially, assign at least one responder to observe ongoing activities surrounding your operating position. This person should be alert for criminal activities and the potential for secondary events.
- Plan tentative escape routes for emergency personnel and refuge assembly points.
- Prepare for emergency decontamination on arrival and during all phases of the incident. *See Attachment 3, "Decontamination of Casualties"*

#### **F. INCIDENT COMMAND FOR TERRORIST INCIDENTS, GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.**

1. Coordination of multiple response agencies.
  - The incident commander (IC) must ensure that all participating agencies (local, state, and federal) are effectively communicating within the designated command structure.
  - Regular planning sessions should be conducted to review the progress of assigned tasks and to incorporate new resources as they engage or disengage from the incident.
  - When multiple agencies are operating on site, the IC must request or appoint a representative or liaison for each.
2. Unique scene control/security issues.
  - Ongoing criminal activities will likely impact scene control initiatives. Police may limit or restrict

access to the scene due to security concerns.

- Due to the dynamic nature of criminal activity, anticipate that the incident perimeter will be larger than would be expected simply due to the incident scope.
3. Special awareness that responders may be an intended target.
    - Consider that terrorists may still be on the scene, waiting for responders to arrive. The intent could be to add responders to the victim list.
  4. Specialized resources.
    - Terrorist events will generate responses from many agencies. Some of the response teams will provide personnel who are specially trained and equipped to support operational objectives. Examples include the Horry County COBRA Team, FBI Hazardous Materials Response Unit and Law Enforcement Bomb Disposal Teams.
  5. Crime scene considerations (evidential preservation).
    - Responders working in the confines of a crime scene must respect the mission of law enforcement investigators. Assist the mission by identifying and preserving potential evidence whenever encountered or suspected.

#### **G. THE ROLE OF THE INCIDENT COMMANDER (IC).**

- The IC must safely, effectively and efficiently manage response resources to achieve the most favorable incident outcomes possible.
- Follow the "SEE" principle.
  - S**afe -No one gets hurt.
  - E**ffective -Everyone works toward stated objectives.
  - E**fficient -All resources are utilized to maximum benefit.
- Management of the incident is based on two components:
  - (1) Establishing and updating priorities.
    - Life safety.
    - Incident stabilization.
    - Property and environmental conservation.
    - Investigation of cause and origin.
  - (2) Continual size-up based on all available information.
    - Present situation.
    - Predicted behavior.
    - Incident Command responsibilities may include, but are not limited to:
      - \* Establishing command.

- \* Hazard and risk assessment.
- \* Notifications.
- \* Developing and implementing site safety.
- \* Ensuring responder protection levels.
- \* Public protection.
- \* Developing and implementing integrated Incident Action Plans (IAP).
- \* Controlling hazards.
- \* Requesting specialized resources.
- \* Resource management.
- \* Evaluating progress.
- \* Logistical support.
- \* Information control.
- \* Incident termination.

#### **H. UNIFIED COMMAND.**

- Command and control issues at terrorist incidents will likely involve a unified command system in order to properly coordinate the various agencies and authorities involved in responding to the incident.
- This plan designates the involved Police Department as the lead local agency for crisis management for terrorist incidents affecting Horry County. It also designates the Horry County Emergency Management Department as the lead agency for consequence management. Other key local agencies include: COBRA Team; Fire Departments; EMS; Health Department.
- Presidential Decision Directive-39 identifies the FBI as the lead agency for federal crisis management during terrorist incidents involving nuclear, biological, or chemical materials. It identifies FEMA as the lead agency for federal consequence management during terrorist incidents involving nuclear, biological, or chemical materials.

#### **I. TRANSITION OF INCIDENT COMMAND.**

The initial Incident Commander for a major terrorist incident in Horry County will be the Police Department. As state and federal assistance arrives and the scope of the response grows more complex, the need to transition from incident command to unified command may become obvious. This transition must be accepted by all City/County officials will support such a transition.

#### **J. TERMINATION OF THE INCIDENT.**

Termination procedures include debriefing all response participants. For terrorist incidents, debriefing sessions are especially important to responders that are unfamiliar with weapons of mass destruction. Recognize the potential for psychological impacts for several reasons:

- Most responders are not accustomed to dealing with chemical and biological warfare agents;
- Responders may have been the intended target;
- Exposure concerns may cause post-incident stress.

#### **K. RECOVERY.**

- Presumably, response/recovery incurred expenses will be borne by the City/County without a federal

disaster declaration.

- The President may declare a "federal emergency" under Title V of the Stafford Act. The emergency declaration only covers disaster-related emergency debris removal and emergency protective measures. As disaster damage information is collected and evaluated, the President may change the "federal emergency" to a "major disaster" declaration. The recovery efforts of the federal government are guided by the Stafford Act.
- If a terrorist incident creates a nuclear emergency which results in contamination, site restoration will be based on technical considerations (primarily health and safety) at the time of the event. The Price-Anderson Act, which is designed primarily to address cost recovery for accidents at commercial nuclear plants, including transport of nuclear fuels, does not specifically address terrorist theft, sabotage, or diversion of nuclear materials.



## Attachment 2

### **SPECIFIC TERRORISM HAZARDS: FIREARMS; EXPLOSION; BIOLOGICAL AGENTS; CHEMICAL AGENTS; INCENDIARY DEVICES; NUCLEAR DEVICES.**

#### **RESPONSE TACTICS, PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE MEASURES, AND CASUALTY TREATMENT**

##### **FIREARMS.**

- A. Overview.** Armed attack incidents can include many different scenarios and types of weapons. Harm occurs from physical trauma inflicted from the weapon(s). Terrorists generally utilize weapons that can kill the largest number of persons in the shortest amount of time.
- B. Types of Harm.**
1. Primary: Mechanical. Historically the weapons of choice have been 9 mm semi-automatic pistols, 9 mm machine guns and AK-47 type assault rifles.
  2. Secondary: Etiological (disease causing). Etiological harm may come from contact with blood and other bodily fluids.
- C. Personnel Protective Measures.**
1. Time - Until the scene has been secured by law enforcement officials, any time spent in the area should be kept to an extreme minimum. Time spent in the unsecured area should only be by trained responders executing clear tactical objectives.
  2. Distance - Until the scene has been secured by law enforcement officials, responders should keep an approximate distance of .5 to 1 mile from the shooter's location. Determining the exact distance will be based on topography and the individual situation. The point is to utilize distance as much as possible. Be aware that projectiles from high-powered rifles can travel distances greater than one mile.
  3. Shielding - Implementing shielding from an armed attack can be accomplished by utilizing physical objects such as buildings and response vehicles. In some high risk areas and situations departments have issued protective vests and helmets. Shielding at an armed attack needs to include both horizontal shielding and vertical cover. Projectiles falling from above, as well as shots fired from elevated structures can bypass horizontal shielding. Responders should utilize comprehensive shielding as projectiles can ricochet from any direction.

##### **II. EXPLOSION.**

**A. Overview.**

1. Size and Target. Bombing incidents can involve multiple devices from small pipe bombs to large vehicle bombs. The incident may involve an attack against a fixed target or a group of people such as emergency responders. The incident may be an isolated event or may involve secondary devices, booby traps or suicide bombers.

2. **Materials Used.** Materials involved will always include some form of explosives. However, the detonation may be designed to disperse biological, chemical or radiological materials. The type of bomb involved may be an improvised explosive device or a commercially manufactured explosive.
3. **Detonation Methods.** The bomb may be activated by a timing device or equipped with various switches that can be activated by light, heat, pressure, movement or radio transmission.
4. **Special Considerations.** Currently, bombs are the weapons most frequently used by terrorists. It is important to note that one of the bomb victims may be the bomber. For this reason, victims may be searched for weapons prior to transport.

**B. Outward Warning Signs.**

1. Responders must remain alert at all times for warning indicators when involved with suspected bombings. Warning signs include:
  - Any abandoned container out of place for the surroundings.
  - Obvious devices containing blasting caps, timers, booster charges, etc.
  - Abandoned vehicles not clearly belonging in the immediate environment.
  - Strong chemical odors with no apparent reason.
  - Unusual or foreign devices attached to pressurized containers, bulk storage containers or supply pipes.
  - Trip wires or other booby traps.
  - An incident preceded by a written or verbal threat.
  - Suspicious Mailing Containers.
2. **Detection Methods.** Detection methods are usually limited to outward warning signs for first responders. However, specialized resources will use techniques such as fluoroscopes, detection dogs, and photo ionization detectors.

**C. Types of Harm.**

1. **Thermal.** This would apply to individuals exposed to the heat generated by the detonation. It is usually not an ongoing risk unless there are unexploded materials present.
2. **Radiological.** If the device was designed for the purpose of dispersing radiological contamination or detonated in an area containing radiological materials, this will present a continuing hazard.
3. **Chemical.** Chemical hazards can come from products created as a result of the explosive reaction, from chemicals already present at the detonation site, or which have been included in the device for the purpose of being dispersed. All of these potential hazards must be addressed by responders.
4. **Etiological.** This will be a primary risk if the device is used as a dispersion mechanism. Otherwise, it is always a secondary risk due to mechanical trauma.
5. **Mechanical.** Mechanical harm can result from blast over pressure, shockwaves and fragmentation.

**D. Personnel Protective Measures.**

1. Time.

- a. Pre-blast. Attempting to use time as a protective measure in a preblast situation is a gamble. Once detonation starts, harm will occur almost instantaneously.
  - b. Post-blast. Minimizing exposure time in the affected area will assist in keeping exposure to hazards as low as possible. Work time in the affected area should be kept at a minimum until the area has been evaluated by specialized teams. These teams will search the area for mechanical hazards, unexploded material, radiological hazards, chemical hazards, biological hazards, secondary devices and booby traps.
2. Distance.
- a. Pre-blast. Determining the appropriate distance from a suspected explosive device is difficult. Responders must consider the size and estimated power of the device, topography of the scene and estimation of harm in the event of detonation. Guide 112 in the 2004 Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG 2004) (which provides guidance for Class A and B explosives) states "May explode and throw fragments 1600 meters (1 mile) or more if fire reaches cargo." For public safety at non-fire situations it recommends isolating the area for at least 500 meters (1/3 mile) in all directions. The ERG 2004 further recommends not operating radio transmitters within 100 meters (330 feet) of the device.
  - b. Post-blast. These incidents may involve a large area. Maintaining a proper distance from the affected area until it has been evaluated by specialized teams is important.
3. Shielding.
- a. Pre-blast. Implementing shielding at the scene of a bombing incident can be accomplished by utilizing physical objects such as buildings and response vehicles. If practical, keep out of the line of sight of the scene and stay away from windows.
  - b. Post-blast. May require the use of respiratory protection and protective clothing.

**E. Implementing Self Protection via Time, Distance and Shielding.**

1. Time - Work time in the affected area should be kept to a minimum until the area has been evaluated by specialized teams. Teams will search the area for mechanical hazards, unexploded materials, radiological hazards, hazardous chemicals, biological hazards, secondary devices, and booby traps.
2. Distance - ERG 2004 Guide 112 provides some guidance when dealing with unexploded materials. It also suggests not permitting radio transmitters (which include cellular phones) within 100 meters (330 feet) of any suspected device.
3. Shielding - If practical, keep out-of-line, out-of-sight, of any suspected devices. Buildings and vehicles may provide some protection.

**F. Treatment of Casualties. Casualty treatment follows a standard sequence:**

1. Decontamination;
2. Patient management;

3. Transport to medical facilities (hospital); and
4. Definitive care from medical field.

Clothing removed from victims may contain evidence that can be recovered. When cutting clothing from individuals, responders should avoid, if possible, cutting through holes in the clothing created by shrapnel or other materials that can yield evidence. Identify and bag all such materials for laboratory analysis.

### **III. BIOLOGICAL AGENTS.**

#### **A. Overview.**

Biological incidents will present themselves as either a focused emergency response or a public health emergency. Materials include bacteria, rickettsia, viruses or toxins. These materials are inhaled or ingested into the body to cause harm.

1. Outward Warning Signs and Detection Clues for the Presence of a Biological Agent. There are a number of outward warning signs and detection clues which can alert the responder to the possible presence of biological agents both prior to an incident and at the incident scene.
  - Verbal or written threats.
  - Suspicious bombing incidents that do not cause much blast or fire damage.
  - Abandoned spray device out of place for the surrounding environment.
  - Container from laboratory or biological supply houses.
  - Biohazard, culture or culture media labels.
2. Detection methods for biological agents. On-site detection of biological agents is currently not practical for most first responders. Typically, samples are collected using various techniques including bioassay, mass spectrometry, gas chromatography, and culture of living organisms.

#### **B. Types of Harm.**

1. Primary: Etiological. These materials are classified as Class 6 Hazardous Materials by the US Department of Transportation.
2. Secondary: Chemical. Possible secondary hazard (e.g., at the scene of a clandestine laboratory).
3. Secondary: Mechanical. Possible secondary hazard where explosives have been used to disperse the agent.

#### **C. Personnel Protective Measures.**

1. Time. Keep exposure time and product contact to a minimum.
2. Distance. Keep an appropriate distance from the actual biological material. Stay up wind, uphill and away from contaminated areas and casualties if you don't have the appropriate protection.
3. Shielding. Implementing appropriate shielding in the form of respiratory protection and protective clothing.

**D. Proper Self-Protection Techniques.**

1. Respiratory Protection.
2. Splash Protection (boots and gloves).
3. Emergency Medical Services (EMS) universal precautions including double-gloving.

**E. Treatment Procedures for Casualties Should Generally Follow This Sequence:**

1. Decontamination;
2. Patient Management;
3. Transport to medical facilities (hospital); and,
4. Definitive care from medical field.
  - Decontamination covers a broad scope of activities.
  - Technical Decon refers to decontamination of tools, suits, and other PPE.
  - Emergency Decon of large and small groups -see Attachment #3.
  - Self Decon involves a responder who has been contaminated with a hazardous substance. The responder should remove clothing, decon with the appropriate materials, and then cover him or herself prior to seeking medical evaluation. Follow local protocols for detailed instructions.

**IV. CHEMICAL AGENTS.**

**A. Overview.** Chemical incidents can include many hazardous materials classes. Materials can be inhaled, ingested, absorbed, or injected. Materials can include industrial, chemical, or warfare type agents.

1. Nerve agents are some of the most toxic known chemicals. They are hazardous in their liquid and vapor states and can cause death within minutes of exposure.
  - a. Outward Warning Signs include observation of symptoms such as miosis, runny noses, difficulty breathing, and uncontrolled muscles and bodily functions. Victims may possibly report a fruity odor.
  - b. Detection Methods.
    - Detection papers such as M8 or M9;
    - Colormetric tubes;
    - Military detection kits;
    - Pesticide tickets; and
    - Electronic meters.
2. Vesicants (blister agents) cause red skin (erythema), blisters, irritation, damage to the eyes,

respiratory damage and gastrointestinal effects. Their effect on exposed tissue is somewhat similar to that of a corrosive chemical like lye or a strong acid.

- a. Outward Warning Signs include observation of blistering, redness of skin, irritation of eyes, cough, shortness of breath. Victims may report an odor of garlic or mustard. Lewisite has been reported to smell like geraniums.
  - b. Detection Methods:
    - Detection papers such as M8 and M9;
    - Military detection kits;
    - Colormetric tubes; and
    - Electronic meters.
3. Cyanides or blood agents include common industrial chemicals such as potassium cyanide, which can cause rapid respiratory arrest and death.
- a. Outward Warning Signs include victims showing great difficulty in breathing and onset of cardiac symptoms. Some victims may report an odor of bitter or burnt almonds.
  - b. Detection Methods:
    - Military detection kits.
    - Colormetric tubes.
    - Electronic meters.
4. Pulmonary or choking agents include common industrial chemicals such as chlorine, which can cause eye and airway irritation, dyspnea, chest tightness, and delayed pulmonary edema.
- a. Outward Warning Signs include observation of pulmonary distress among victims. They may also report odors such as chlorine, bleach or swimming pool odors (chlorine) and the odor of newly-mown hay or grass (phosgene).
  - b. Detection Methods.
    - Military detection kits.
    - Colormetric tubes.
    - Electronic meters.
5. Irritants or riot control chemicals such as pepper spray cause burning and pain on exposed mucous membranes and skin, eye pain and tearing, burning in the nostrils, respiratory discomfort, and tingling of the exposed skin.
- a. Outward Warning Signs include observations of classic 'tear gas' symptoms among victims. They may report multiple odors including hair spray and pepper due the variety of propellants used to dispense these agents.
  - b. Detection. There is no detector. The means of identification is by locating and collecting residue for laboratory analysis. Contact state and local law enforcement agencies for additional information. (. . . what could they tell us?)

**B. Types of Harm.**

1. Primary: Chemical - Chemical hazards, of course, include a wide variety of effects including corrosive, reactivity, and a variety of systemic effects which may attack the central nervous system, cardiovascular system, respiratory system and other bodily functions.
2. Secondary: Thermal - Many chemical reactions create heat. Also, the chemicals involved may be flammable.
3. Secondary: Asphyxiation - Some chemical reactions may deplete oxygen or create gases that displace oxygen.
4. Secondary: Mechanical - Corrosive chemicals like strong acids can weaken structural elements.

**C. Personnel Protective Measures.**

1. Time. Keep exposure time and product contact time to a minimum.
2. Distance. Keep an appropriate distance from the actual chemical. Stay up-wind, uphill and away from contaminated areas and casualties if one doesn't have the appropriate protection.
3. Shielding. Implement appropriate shielding in the form of respiratory protection and protective clothing.

**D. Self Protection.**

1. Nerve agents.
  - Follow Montgomery Fire Department procedures for operating at the scene of a hazardous materials incident. If the material has not been positively identified but is suspected to be a nerve agent, follow ERG 2004 Guide 153. Do not make entry into confining environments unless you have been appropriately trained and have the necessary equipment. Use time, distance and shielding to your maximum advantage.
  - Antidotes to nerve agents include Atropine and 2-PAM Chloride.
2. Vesicants (Blister Agents).
  - Follow agency procedures for operating at the scene of a hazardous materials incident. If the material has not been positively identified but vesicants are suspected, follow ERG 2000 Guide 153. Do not make entry into confined spaces unless you have been properly trained and have the necessary equipment. Use time, distance and shielding to your maximum advantage.
3. Cyanides (Blood Agents).
  - Follow agency procedures for operating at the scene of a hazardous material incident.
  - If the substance has been positively identified as Cyanogen Chloride, use ERG 2004 Guide 125.

- If the material is positively identified as Hydrogen Cyanide, use ERG 2004 Guide 117.
  - If a blood agent is suspected, but not positively identified, use ERG 2004 Guide 123.
  - There is an antidote kit for blood agents called the Pasadena Cyanide Antidote.
4. Pulmonary (Choking) Agents.
- Follow agency procedures for operating at the scene of a hazardous materials incident. If the material has been identified as Chlorine, use ERG 2004 Guide 124.
  - If the material has been identified as Phosgene, use ERG 2004 Guide 125. If a choking agent is suspected, but has not been positively identified, use ERG 2004 Guide 123.
5. Irritants.
- Follow agency procedures for operating at the scene of a hazardous materials incident. For tear gas or pepper spray, or for unidentified irritants, use ERG 2004 Guide 159.
  - If Mace is identified, use ERG 2004 Guide 153.

**E. Treatment of casualties. Casualty treatment follows a standard sequence:**

1. Decontamination per local protocol.
2. Patient management.
3. Transport to medical facilities (hospital).
4. Definitive care from medical field.

**V. INCENDIARY DEVICES.**

**A. Overview.** Incendiary incidents involve flammable devices that are either stationary or hand-thrown. Incendiary devices are used in approximately 20-25% of all bombing incidents in the United States and can include many different chemicals and flammable or explosive devices.

1. Outward Warning Signs and Indicators of Incendiary Use. These are similar to the detection clues for arson investigations and include:
  - Prior warning (phone calls).
  - Multiple fire locations.
  - Signs of accelerants.
  - Containers from flammable liquids.
  - Splatter patterns indicating a thrown device.
  - Fusing residue.
  - Signs of forced entry to the structure.
  - Common appliances out of place for the environment.

These clues should simply be a signal for the responder to take appropriate precautions to safeguard themselves and the public and to start considering the incident as a potential crime scene.

2. Detection Methods. Various methods of detecting chemical residue indicating incendiary use are available including: colorimetric tubes, combustible gas meters, flame ionization detectors, trained dogs, and photo-ionization detectors.

**B. Types of Harm.**

1. Primary: Thermal.
2. Secondary: Asphyxiation. Asphyxiation is always a possibility due to the fact that burning depletes oxygen.
3. Secondary: Chemical. The incendiary material may release a chemical hazard or other fuels present may generate chemical hazards.
4. Secondary: Mechanical. Secondary from structural damage, thrown devices or secondary events or explosions.

**C. Personnel Protective Measures.**

1. Time. Keep exposure time in the affected area and product contact time to a minimum.
2. Distance. Keep an appropriate distance from any chemicals. Stay up wind, uphill and away from contaminated areas and casualties if one doesn't have the appropriate protection.
3. Shielding. Implement appropriate shielding in the form of respiratory protection and protective clothing.

**D. Self Protection.**

1. Approach the scene utilizing appropriate personal protective clothing equipment.
2. Do not handle any suspicious device.
3. Avoid vapor clouds, mists, and liquids.
4. Call for technical assistance.

**E. Treatment of Casualties.**

1. Consider decontamination.
2. Patient management.
3. Transport to medical facilities (hospital).
4. Definitive care from medical professionals.

**VI. NUCLEAR DEVICES.**

**A. Overview.**

Terrorist nuclear incidents are most likely going to involve the use of an explosive dispersion device or any other means to spread nuclear materials. Intelligence sources report that the use of a nuclear fission device to cause a nuclear detonation is highly unlikely if not nearly impossible. Identifying a nuclear incident may be difficult due to the fact that radiation cannot be detected by the senses and that symptoms of radiological exposure are generally delayed for hours or days.

1. **Outward Warning Signs and Detection Clues.** Outward warning indicators include placards, labels and specialized packaging such as lead containers. Responders should be well-acquainted with the standard radiation warning symbols and hazardous materials containers. For additional information, check the North America Emergency Response Guide (ERG 2004).
2. **Detection Methods for Nuclear Contamination.** Electronic equipment will likely be the only means of testing an area for radiation. Properly trained responders should survey any incident scene with radiation detectors following a suspicious explosion or terrorist threat.

**B. Types of Harm.**

1. **Primary: Radiological.** Due to the nature of radiological materials, this will present an ongoing hazard, the scope of which will only be determined when the amount and identity of the substance involved is ascertained.
2. **Secondary: Chemical.** Many radiological substances are also chemical hazards. This is an area that may be overlooked by responders concentrating on radiation effects.

**C. Personnel Protective Measures.**

Remember that radiological detection equipment is the best method to determine if your self-protective measures are effective and appropriate.

1. **Time.** Spend the shortest amount of time in the suspected contaminated area.
2. **Distance.** Keep an appropriate distance from the suspected contaminated area. The ERG 2004, page 161, section on radiological materials recommends to isolate the area for at least 25 to 50 meters (80 to 160 feet) in all directions and to stay upwind.
3. **Shielding.** Implementing shielding at the scene of a radiological incident can be accomplished by utilizing physical objects such as buildings and response vehicles. The penetration effects of radiation are dependent upon the type of material and the nature of the radiation emitted. As a rule of thumb, keep as much mass between the responder(s) and suspected radiological materials as possible.
4. **Avoiding Internal Contamination.** Do not eat or drink in any area with a suspected or confirmed radiological hazard.

**D. Self Protection. Implement personal protection through time, distance and shielding.**

**E. Treatment Procedures Sequence for Casualties (General):**

1. Decontamination.

2. Patient management.
3. Transport to medical facilities (hospital).
4. Definitive care from medical field.

## Attachment 3

### DECONTAMINATION OF CASUALTIES

#### I. OVERVIEW.

HazMat Plans and associated procedures address the capabilities and provisions for decontaminating mass casualties, from triage to hospital.

Quick decontamination of victims is the goal of first responders. The most effective decontamination time is within 1 to 2 minutes after exposure. The simple removal of the victims' clothing (including any undergarments) can effectively remove as much as 80% of the contaminants.

At a minimum, immediate gross decontamination will be performed on all patients expected or known to be at risk for direct or secondary contamination. All decontamination actions conducted by first responders will be carried out using the appropriate personal protection equipment (PPE) as determined by the senior HazMat officer on-scene or by the appropriate standard operating procedures (SOPs). Decontamination will be performed in two stages:

1. Gross decontamination involves the safe removal of the victim from the contaminated environment, complete removal of the victims clothes and a complete head to toe rinse with the appropriate solution.
2. Definitive decontamination is carried out by a series of washes and rinses until such time that it is certain that all contaminants have been removed from the victim (definitive decontamination will usually take place at a medical facility).

First responding units arriving at a suspected terrorist attack will position their apparatus and equipment in an up-wind position and prepare to set up a trench decontamination corridor using on-board appliances and water supply. If and when possible first-in engine or aerial companies should connect to an appropriate hydrant and conduct a forward lay to provide a supply line to guarantee an uninterrupted water supply to adequately perform gross decontamination operation, and anticipate the initial elements of a decontamination corridor. In the absence of a hydrant then a secondary source of water must be located. Drafting operations should be considered and the appropriate tanker apparatus should be deployed.

#### II. STANDARD OPERATING GUIDELINE: VICTIM RAPID GROSS DECONTAMINATION.

A review of casualty producing hazardous materials incidents and mass casualty incidents involving agents used as weapons establishes that those casualties who are able quickly leave the affected area. Many of these casualties then self- refer to a medical facility while still contaminated with the toxic agent. The result can be a chain of cross contamination extending from the incident to the hospital. In addition, the medical facility and health care providers can then become casualties.

Incidents involving the need to rapidly decontaminate large numbers of persons are problematic for other reasons as well. Strategies using flushing of contaminated persons with water streams from firefighting apparatus have limitations. Environmental factors such as cold weather may make this method impractical. Arguably, this sort of flushing prior to disrobing may also carry agent through to the skin and many may be reluctant to disrobe publicly, a necessary follow-up action following the dowsing.

Victim Rapid Gross Decontamination addresses these issues by providing the most rapidly deployable, waterless decontamination scheme for walking wounded that also makes an attempt to provide some minimal privacy.

This plan is primarily intended for incidents involving toxins purposely used as weapons against civilian populations. It exists in addition to other Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs) and operational documents.

In the event of a known dispatch to a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) event involving mass casualties or upon identification of such an event from a first response company, the following specific actions will occur:

### **METHOD**

1. A perimeter will be established by first response personnel in full PPE.
2. The COBRA Team will be dispatched along with other Medical Response System components.
3. Horry Emergency Management/EOC will be notified by Dispatch of the need for buses to be diverted to the incident staging area.
4. Two garment changing corridors will be set up.
5. Walking wounded will be directed through the corridors where they will be directed to:
  - a) wipe exposed skin areas with solvent and disposable towels,
  - b) disrobe to undergarments,
  - c) bag clothing in biohazard bags,
  - d) wipe exposed skin areas an additional time,
  - e) re-robe in disposable garments and booties, and
  - f) exit the corridor and be directed to safe contained area.
  - g) In cold weather, casualties will be provided with a disposable blanket(s).
6. Buses will be moved from the staging area driven by HazMat personnel in proper level PPE, as directed if victims need to be moved to another location.
7. Buses will be directed by the incident Transportation Officer to a destination facility. Buses will be staffed by, at a minimum, two BLS attendants capable of administering nerve agent antidote.
8. Casualties will receive a thorough decontamination at the destination facility.